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One of the great questions in psychology concerns how we develop to become intentional 
agents. Ideomotor theory suggests that intentional actions depend on, and emerge from the 
automatic acquisition of bidirectional action–effect associations: perceiving an action–effect 
sequence creates an integrated representation that can be employed for action control in the 
opposite order, selecting an action by anticipating its effect. We provide first evidence for the 
spontaneous acquisition of bidirectional action–effect associations in 9- 12-, and 18-month-olds, 
suggesting that the mechanism underlying action–effect integration is in place at the latest 
around 9 months of age.
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holds that action and perception share a common representational 
domain and stresses the interplay between, and mutual dependency 
of perception and action. This provides a broad theoretical back-
ground and motivation for the assumption that actions and codes 
of their perceptual consequences are associated in a bidirectional 
fashion. This bidirectionality is particularly important for ideomo-
tor theorizing because it assumes that perceiving the sequence of 
action and effect creates a representational structure that can be 
used for action control in the opposite order (anticipation of action 
effect leading to action). TEC also suggests that the same represen-
tational format is used for observed and self-initiated action thus 
also providing a framework for action understanding.
Evidence for the acquisition of bidirectional associations between 
actions and their effects has been found in different species, such 
as cats, rats, and pigeons, in humans ranging in age from 4-year-
olds (Eenshuistra et al., 2004; Kray et al., 2006) to adults (Elsner 
and Hommel, 2001), and for a wide range of actions and effects 
(for a review see Hommel and Elsner, 2009). Action–effect acquisi-
tion is modulated by the same factors that influence instrumental 
learning (e.g., temporal contiguity and contingency of movement 
and effect: Elsner and Hommel, 2004) and does not depend on 
voluntary attention (Elsner and Hommel, 2001; Band et al., 2009; 
Dutzi and Hommel, 2009), suggesting that it is a fairly automatic 
process indeed (Elsner and Hommel, 2004). Additionally, action–
effect acquisition has been found after just one trial (Dutzi and 
Hommel, 2009).
Given this apparently high degree of automaticity and the strong 
evidence that very young infants are sensitive to action–effect con-
tingencies (e.g., DeCasper and Fifer, 1980; Gergely and Watson, 1999; 
Rochat and Striano, 1999; for a review, see Rovee-Collier, 1987), it 
seems likely that the proposed mechanism is already operative in 
early infancy. However, even though the role of action–effect learn-
ing in the development of voluntary action is receiving increasing 
IntroductIon
Humans actively manipulate their environment to reach goals, 
that is, to produce particular intended effects. As the selection of 
goal-directed actions logically depends on associations between 
actions and their consequences, memories for actions and their 
consequences must exist to permit the actor to choose the right 
action for a given desired outcome. Some authors have suggested 
that intentional action and the capability to create goal represen-
tations are with us from birth on – or even earlier (e.g., Meltzoff 
and Moore, 1977; Rochat, 2001; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). 
However, given that a meaningful representation of an action goal 
requires knowledge about action–effect relations, the complexity, 
and flexibility of human behavior make it unlikely that action goals 
are innate (Elsner and Hommel, 2004). Accordingly, other authors 
have suggested that action goals emerge through experience (Heyes, 
2001) and through the observation of the relationship between 
actions and their perceptual consequences in particular (Lotze, 
1852; James, 1890; Greenwald, 1970; Hommel and Elsner, 2009).
One of the first theories addressing how infants (and older learn-
ers of novel actions) acquire action–effect associations and how 
they utilize these associations to produce goal-directed actions was 
put forward by James (1890). His ideomotor theory states that all 
actions (or movements) are necessarily involuntary at first and 
thus no more than motor babbling (cf., Meltzoff and Moore, 1997). 
However, through experience actions and their effects are automati-
cally integrated and become associated in a bidirectional fashion. 
This renders action–effect representations mental cues of actions, 
so that actions can be performed voluntarily by imagining the 
wanted action effect – which reactivates the respective effect rep-
resentation and primes the associated action. Ideomotor theory was 
revived and refined by Greenwald (1970), Prinz (1990, 1997), and 
Hommel (1996), Elsner and Hommel (2001), and then elaborated 
into the Theory of Event Coding (TEC; Hommel et al., 2001). TEC 
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Our task was modeled after the experimental setup used in the 
free-choice experiments of Elsner and Hommel (2001). Elsner 
and Hommel had adults carry out self-chosen left and right key 
presses in response to a visual trigger stimulus. Each key press 
produced a particular sound (e.g., left key → low tone, right key ← 
high tone), and even though these sounds were irrelevant for the 
task, it was assumed that participants would acquire bidirectional 
associations between key presses and tone representations. After 
this acquisition phase, participants were again freely choosing 
left and right key presses, but in this test phase the visual trigger 
was replaced by an auditory trigger stimulus: high and low tones 
(identical to the previous action effects) presented in random 
sequence. As predicted, people were quicker and more likely to 
choose the action that previously had produced the currently 
presented trigger tone (e.g., they were quicker and more likely 
to press the left key when hearing the low than the high tone), 
suggesting that key presses and tones were indeed associated in 
a bidirectional fashion.
When adopting this paradigm for our infant subjects, we real-
ized after piloting that versions of the original binary-choice task 
were too demanding. We therefore simplified the task in such a 
way that only one (very large) touch-sensitive key was presented to 
the infants, the two action alternatives being the touching or not 
touching of the key. Moreover, given Dutzi and Hommel’s (2009) 
demonstration of action–effect learning after just one presenta-
tion, we also greatly reduced the number of acquisition- and test 
trials, so to minimize demands on infants’ limited attention. In 
the acquisition phase, infants were presented with two multimo-
dal (and thus very salient and attention-grabbing) events, one 
being self-produced by touching the key (a true action effect) and 
another that was presented while infants were prevented from 
touching the key, so that the event was not self-produced. In the 
test phase, we presented the two multimodal events in different 
blocks and expected the previously self-produced event stimulat-




Three groups of infants were tested: twenty-two 9-month-olds 
(mean: 9.09 months, SD = 0.18, 7 female), twenty-one 12-month-
olds (mean: 12.10 months, SD = 0.26, 10 female), and twenty-two 
18-month-olds (mean: 18.02 months, SD = 0.32, 8 female). Four 
additional 9-month-olds, three 12-month-olds, and two 18-month-
olds were excluded due to fussiness. One 12-month-old was 
excluded due to experimental error. The participants were recruited 
through advertizements in local papers, daycares, maternity wards, 
and general practitioners. Infants were randomly and equally dis-
tributed across conditions, and they received small gifts as reward. 
An informed consent was obtained from all caretakers.
aPParatus
During the experiment infants sat in their caretaker’s lap in a cur-
tained booth. The multimodal stimuli (sounds and images) were 
presented via a 30-inch widescreen monitor with built-in speakers 
situated at a distance of 60 cm from the infants. A brightly-colored 
touch-sensitive key was placed right in front of the infant. The key 
attention, this interest is mostly focused on infants’ interpretation 
and imitation of other people’s goal-directed actions. The central 
assumption underlying various studies is that acquired action–
effect associations are instrumental in understanding and imitation 
of actions. Indeed, action effects have been shown to be important 
for action understanding (e.g., Biro and Leslie, 2007; for a review, 
see Kiraly et al., 2003; Hauf, 2007) and in imitation behavior, as 
infants are more likely to reproduce actions that have a salient action 
effect (Klein et al., 2006; Hauf and Aschersleben, 2008; for a review, 
see Elsner, 2007; Meltzoff, 2007). Although these studies suggest 
that observed action–effect relations in other people’s actions can 
influence infant’s imitation behavior and action understanding, 
they do not tell whether infants learn action–effect associations 
by exploring the world themselves. Furthermore, these studies do 
not provide direct evidence for the assumed bidirectionality of 
action–effect associations, which according to ideomotor theory 
allows the infant to select and produce actions by activating their 
perceptual consequences.
The present study sought for more direct evidence for the 
acquisition of bidirectional action–effect in infancy. Although we 
hypothesize that the ability to learn action–effect associations is 
present from early infancy, action production and action control are 
extremely limited in very young babies, thus rendering behavioral 
measurements difficult. Since investigating bidirectional action–
effect acquisition requires participants to carry out some sort of 
motor actions, a possible lack of evidence in very young infants 
could simply be due to limitations in their motor capabilities rather 
than to the inability to associate and rely on action–effect relations. 
Adult and children studies on learning action–effect associations 
typically used manual actions such as pressing a button. Good 
control over these types of manual actions develops in the sec-
ond half of the first year (Belsky and Most, 1981). In addition, 
previous research showed that the earliest age at which infants’ 
own actions are influenced by observed effects of others’ actions is 
around 9 months (Hauf and Aschersleben, 2008). At this same age 
infants begin to distinguish means from ends in their own behavior 
(Piaget, 1952; Willatts, 1999; Goubet et al., 2006). This ability is 
often thought to be a prerequisite for goal-directed action control, 
as it enables infants to specify and represent goals before perform-
ing the corresponding actions (Hauf, 2007). Therefore, we expected 
that at 9 months infants will likely show evidence for bidirectional 
action–effect acquisition via their own manual exploratory behav-
ior. Furthermore, Elsner and Aschersleben’s (2003) study suggests 
that there are developmental changes in the effect that observed 
action–effect relations have on infants’ own behavior. They found 
that with a higher task demand the behavior of 12 but not 9 months 
of age infants was influenced by an observed action–effect. In addi-
tion, a further step was observed at around 15–18 months when 
infants’ behavior started to be affected by whether the effect they 
could produce matched with the observed effect. Testing 9, 12, 
and 18-months-olds’ ability to acquire bidirectional action–effects 
by their own exploratory behavior can help clarify whether the 
nature of these changes lies in the development of specific imita-
tive skills for transferring others action into one’s own action or in 
the accuracy of encoding specific action–effect relations due to, for 
example, increasing working memory capacity or brain maturation 
(Diamond, 2006).
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meaningless sounds that started simultaneously with the 1000 ms 
presentations of a picture (either bright-colored cartoon of a car 
or a mouse)1.
After the acquisition phase there was a 30 s break during which 
caretaker and infant turned away from the monitor while engaging 
in entertaining the infant. The test phase consisted of three trials, 
in which the previously self-produced event, the previously experi-
enced action-independent event, or no event was presented. Each of 
these trials lasted 30 s, during which the infant could freely touch the 
key. In between the test trials there was a 10 s break during which the 
caretaker prevented the infant from responding by holding his/her 
hands. The self-produced and action-independent events were pre-
sented first and second, or vice versa, with the order being balanced 
across participants, while the baseline trial was always administered 
last – so to minimize possible forgetting and extinction of action–
effect associations. Methods were approved by the ethical committee 
of the Leiden University, Institute for Psychological Research.
data acquIsItIon
In acquisition trials, we measured latencies online and, based on 
the offline inspection of the video tape, the number of undetec-
ted motor responses (visible scratches and touches of the key that 
were too light for the conductance-sensitive key to detect) and 
the number of responses on which the infants were helped by the 
caretaker. Given that the acquisition of action–effect associations 
is sensitive to contingency and extinction (Elsner and Hommel, 
2004), the undetected (and therefore not “effect-rewarded”) motor 
responses were considered particularly important. In test trials, 
we measured the latency of the first response and the number 
of responses (key touches). From the latter, response frequency 
was calculated for each infant based on his/her total number of 
responses in all three test trials, thus correcting for motivational 
differences (see Table 1).
was built into a wooden board that was attached to the booth below 
the monitor (see Figure 1). Presentation and latency recording 
was controlled by E-prime™ software. A camera located above the 
booth recorded the touch-sensitive key. Another camera behind 
the infant recorded the stimulus presentation. The cameras fed a 
mixer that produced a split-image movie of the infants’ actions on 
the key and stimuli.
Procedure
Instructions were given to the caretakers prior to the experiment. 
The experiment consisted of two phases: the acquisition phase and 
the test phase. The acquisition phase was composed of two blocks 
of five trials with self-produced multimodal events and two blocks 
of five trials with action-independent multimodal events, in an 
alternating order. This setup resulted for all infants in 20 acquisi-
tion trials, 10 self-produced effect trials, and 10 action-independent 
effect presentations. We chose multimodal events to maximize their 
discriminability and attention-grabbing potential.
In blocks with action-independent events, infants were presented 
with one of the two audiovisual events five times in a row, while 
the caregiver prevented the infant from touching the key by gently 
holding the infant’s hands. To ensure the infant paid attention to 
the screen the presentation was triggered by the experimenter, who 
monitored the infant online. In case of distraction the experimenter 
waited for attention to return. In blocks with self-produced events, 
the infant’s hands were free and could press the touch-sensitive key. 
Each touch of the key immediately elicited a presentation of an 
audiovisual event. Before another effect could be elicited the previ-
ous effect had to end. The caretakers were instructed to encourage 
the infants to press the key. Between the blocks there was a short 
break of 10 s to ensure that infant and caretaker were ready for the 
next block. Additionally, a red or green dot was presented on the 
monitor during the blocks to remind the caretakers which block 
they were in. The bimodal effects were two distinct 500 ms long 
Figure 1 | experimental setup. The infant sat on the caretaker’s lap while 
perceiving the stimulus events and pushing the touch-sensitive button that 
produced the action effect.
Table 1 | Mean number of responses (#) and mean percentage (%) of 
responses for 9-month-olds (n = 22), 12-month-olds (n = 21), and 
18-month-olds (n = 22) in Self-Produced, Action-independent and 
No-event test-trials.
Test-trial type Self-produced Action No event 
  independent
Age groups # % # % # %
9-month-olds 5.00 38.95 4.91 41.23 2.50 19.73
12-month-olds 3.67 36.38 4.33 41.60 2.24 22.02
18-month-olds 4.86 49.53 4.36 26.67 2.41 23.75
1We decided not to balance action-independent and self-produced effects across 
participants after a pilot experiment had revealed no preference for one or the other 
effect. The pilot investigated 15 participants, five from each of the three age groups. 
Infants were shown the button but prevented from touching; and it was checked 
whether the infant was actually looking at the button. We then presented the two 
bimodal events in random order, and the infant had the opportunity to touch the 
button for 30 s. A short break, during which infants were prevented from reac-
ting again, divided the two presentations. The two effect stimuli did not yield any 
reliable difference in the latencies [F(1,12) = 0.627, p = 0.444] or the number of 
responses [F(1,13) = 0.398, p = 0.389], nor was there any hint to interactions with 
age or order of presentation.
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and the number of undetected responses during the acquisition as 
covariate. There was no main effect of trial type [F(1,61) = 0.70, 
p = 0.41, η2p = 0.011] but a close-to-significant interaction of trial 
type and age group, F(2,61) = 2.89, p = 0.063, η2p = 0.087. Separate 
exploratory between-subjects ANCOVAs revealed that there was 
no trial-type effect in the 9- or the 12-month-olds, Fs < 1, but 
responses were more frequent to self-produced than action-inde-
pendent events in the 18-month-olds, F(1,20) = 5.31, p = 0.032, 
η2p = 0.210.
dIscussIon
In the present study we sought evidence for the spontaneous acquisi-
tion of bidirectional action–effect associations in early infancy. As 
expected, 9-, 12-, and 18-month-olds were faster to respond to events 
that they previously had actively produced than to action-independ-
ent events, indicating that all age groups indeed formed bidirectional 
action–effect associations during the acquisition phase. Moreover, 
at least the 18-months-olds also had a stronger tendency to perform 
the action again and more often compared when presented with 
the effect they previously caused than with the action-independent 
event. Altogether, we consider this pattern a rather close replication 
of the Elsner and Hommel (2001) finding in adults.
Unexpectedly, the latency measure turned out to be more sensi-
tive than the response-frequency measure, which showed evidence 
for action–effect acquisition in the 18-month-olds only. This dif-
ferential sensitivity might be due to several, not necessarily mutually 
exclusive factors. For one, it is possible that the younger infants 
were creating weaker or less specific associations between action 
and effect representations in the acquisition phase. These weaker 
associations might have been sufficient to drive the first response, 
which therefore was faster to self-produced effects, but might have 
fallen prey to extinction too soon to produce a larger number of 
responses to self-produced effects than to action-independent 
effects. Indeed, some evidence for extinction has been obtained 
results
acquIsItIon Phase
One-way between-subjects ANOVAs were carried out to assess pos-
sible differences between the three age groups in the acquisition 
phase. No reliable differences were obtained for the mean latencies 
for responses in trials with self-produced events, in the percentage 
of responses in which the infants were helped by the caretaker, or 
in the timing of the presentation of the action-independent events 
(Fs < 1). However, we did find an effect of age group on the number 
of undetected key touches, F(2,62) = 3.23, p = 0.032, ηp2 0 105= . : 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that the 12-month-olds overall had 
significantly more undetected responses (3.33) than the 9-month-
olds (0.95), p = 0.01, but not than the 18-month-olds (1.82).
test Phase
To assess possible differences in motivation and/or motor abilities, 
we ran an ANOVA on the total number of responses made in all 
three test trials, but no effect of age was obtained. The mean number 
of responses during the test phase was 11.45.
A between-subjects ANCOVA was carried out on the latencies 
of first responses in the test trials, with trial type (previously self-
produced vs. action-independent stimulus event) as within-subjects 
and age group (9, 12, 18 months) as between-subjects factor (see 
Figure 2). In this analysis we considered the number of undetected 
responses during acquisition as a covariate, so to control for extinc-
tion, and the total number of responses during all three test trials, 
so to control for the overall level of activity. We found a significant 
main effect of trial type, F(1,51) = 4.67, p = 0.035, ηp2 0 564= . : Infants 
responded significantly faster to self-produced events (5.57 s) than 
to action-independent events (6.64 s). No effects of age group or 
interactions with the covariates were found.
We ran another mixed-factor ANCOVA on the response pro-
portions in the test trials, normalized through an Arcsin transfor-
mation. Trial type and age group served as factors (see Figure 3) 
Figure 2 | Mean Latencies (+Se) for 9-month-olds (n = 22), 12-month-
olds (n = 21) and 18-month-olds (n = 22) to self-produced event and 
action-independent event.
Figure 3 | Mean Percentage of responses (+Se) for 9-month-olds (n = 
22), 12-month-olds (n = 21) and 18-month-olds (n = 22) to self-produced 
event and action-independent event.
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motor activation as such must rely on bidirectional associations 
between action codes and action–effects codes, as predicted from 
ideomotor theory.
In summary, our findings demonstrate the spontaneous, non-
intentional acquisition of bidirectional action–effect associations 
in infants no older than 9 months. This observation by no means 
contradicts nativist ideas about action goal representations but it 
does provide a theoretical alternative that makes the less parsimoni-
ous nativist assumptions unnecessary. Apparently, infants are able 
to pick up action effects that they are able to control on the fly 
and establish bidirectional associations between representations of 
these action effects and the motor actions (or class of motor action) 
producing them. This way, infants acquire not only possible future 
action goals but also the means to reach them whenever they might 
become interested in doing so later on. In other words, human 
action goals might be grounded in and through the acquisition and 
anticipation of action-contingent perceptual effects. This fits with 
findings from studies on action perception, showing that infants 
around 9 months more readily encode actions that have salient 
action effects as goal-directed (Biro, Verschoor, Coalter and Leslie, 
in preparation; Biro and Leslie, 2007; Hauf, 2007), and with studies 
on imitation, showing that 9-month-olds can use observed action 
effects for action control (Elsner, 2007). Taken altogether, these 
previous and the present findings provide considerable support 
for the basic assumption of TEC (Hommel et al., 2001) that the 
integration of actions and their effects provides a common repre-
sentational format for the coding of observed and self-produced 
actions, thus making interactions between them possible.
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even in adults (Elsner and Hommel, 2001). For another, it is pos-
sible that younger infants were less likely to retrieve the required 
action–effect associations in the test phase – be it due to less flexible 
transfer from the acquisition to the test context or because of higher 
cortical noise (note that the greatest changes in myelination occur 
during the first 3 years: Carmody et al., 2004). In any case, the fact 
that only 18 months old infants showed evidence for action–effect 
acquisition in response-frequency measure, fits with the develop-
mental changes found in the Elsner and Aschersleben’s (2003) study 
that we mentioned before. Similar to the current finding, in their 
study the age groups did not differ from each other in their latency 
measures while only the 18-month-olds performed more target 
actions when the effect they could produce matched the effect of 
the observed model’s action. Although the two studies are different 
in their design and in their research questions, our finding suggests 
that the differential frequency pattern found between age groups in 
their study was not, or not only, due to the development of imita-
tive skills, but may have been due to differences in the strength of 
specific action–effect associations. Nevertheless, in our study the 
latency measures showed that all age groups acquired a bidirectional 
action–effect association.
A disadvantage of our simplified design is that it does not allow 
distinguishing associations between the effect stimuli and specific 
motor responses from associations between effect stimuli and a 
broader range of motor activities. For instance, it is possible that 
the self-produced effect became associated not so much with 
particular manual key-reaching actions but with general motor 
activity or playing in general, while the action-independent effect 
became associated with lack of activity. On the one hand, such an 
approach does not seem to fit with the behavior of our partici-
pants in the action-independent effect condition – as evident from 
the session tapes, which did produce motor activity that however 
was not specifically directed to the key. On the other hand, even 
such a rather unspecific association between effect stimuli and 
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